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STATE COMPETITION FOR CLOSE
CORPORATION CHARTERS:
A COMMENTARY
ROBERTA ROMANO*
Ian Ayres' article, Judging Close Corporations in the Age of Statutes,1
raises some interesting questions concerning the relation between courts
and legislatures in the production of corporation codes and the degree to
which our general understanding of state competition for corporate char-
ters is applicable to close corporations. These issues have not been con-
sidered by scholars participating in the debate over the efficacy of state
corporation laws. Ayres' article suggests that there is no reason to expect
an overlap of concern, because one of his central points is that the
processes by which public corporations and close corporations come to
be regulated are quite distinct.
I have a few quibbles with some of the characterizations in the article,
and while they serve as the focus of my Comment, they really are only
quibbles.
REPHRASING THE QUESTION
My first quibble concerns the article's packaging. Ayres suggests that
there is a contradiction or inconsistency between the work of Ralph Win-
ter and Frank Easterbrook on the efficacy of state competition and Rich-
ard Posner's work on the common law. He contends that state
corporation codes and judicial decisions cannot both be efficient because
sometimes the two disagree; courts ignore or overturn statutes, and legis-
latures override judicial decisions. I think that this packaging is unfortu-
nate, for there is no basis for contending that these scholars' positions are
inconsistent.
First, Ayres' principal thesis is, in fact, an effort to demonstrate that
there is no cause for disagreement among the three because the states do
not compete over close corporation charters. If the states do not com-
pete, there is no necessary reason for Winter and Easterbrook to charac-
* Allen Duffy/Class of 1960 Professor of Law, Yale Law School and School of Organization
and Management.
1. Ian Ayres, Judging Close Corporations in the Age of Statutes, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 365 (1992).
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terize the output of the legislative process as efficient, and they would not
then need to disagree with Posner concerning the efficiency of courts.
Second, state competition in corporation codes is not evidence that the
common law was "not getting the job done," as Ayres suggests.2 Rather,
it is a function of the need for efficient default rules, which readily iden-
tify the standard-form, corporate-law contract for parties in business,
and of comparative institutional advantage. It is difficult, and thus
costly, for lawyers to examine numerous court cases, instead of a corpo-
ration code, to isolate default rules to determine what needs to be explicit
in a corporate charter. Indeed, because case holdings are confined to
particular facts, they are less useful or less easily interpretable as defaults.
My contention is that statutes, which codify an efficient common law,
reduce the transaction costs of doing business in the corporate form.
Hence, there is a need for states to produce and update corporation
codes, even when courts create efficient corporate-law rules or efficiently
interpret statutes. Courts are not, in this view, an institutional rival re-
garding the efficiency of outputs.
Third, and more important, proponents of state competition do not
contend that all state corporation laws are efficient. Rather, they main-
tain that the system tends to efficiency, and that it is more efficient than a
national corporation law regime would be. I assume that believers in the
efficiency of the common law also hold to a similarly more sensible posi-
tion regarding the relative tendency of opinions; this is, in any case, how
Ayres describes Posner's position ("common-law rules tend to be effi-
cient"). If this statement of the two positions is correct, then disagree-
ments between courts and legislatures need not be put in opposition, as in
Ayres' framing. Rather, they are complementary agents and equally effi-
ciency minded; if one branch makes a mistake or is out of touch, the
other moves forward to correct it. Disagreement is temporary and tem-
poral, and it is a quite natural occurrence because business conditions
and practices change over time, rendering rules derived from older ar-
rangements no longer desirable.
Because specific code provisions and judicial opinions are static while
the world of business transactions is dynamic, there is a need for acceler-
ating legal evolution. Evolution is easier and cheaper if courts as well as
legislatures can implement changes. A dual role, and hence "disagree-
2. Id. at 368.
3. Id. at 366.
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ment," can occur without leaping to the conclusion that such an arrange-
ment implies that the two branches are not efficiency minded and
without having to prove that states do not compete for close corporation
charters. I would, at least, want to see evidence of a systematic bias, that
one branch was always correcting the other, before I would reject this
characterization of the efficiency orientation of both branches in favor of
Ayres' either-or-neither choice.
The interesting question for research then, involves determining when
a specific branch, judicial or legislative, is more likely than the other to
be in touch with the changing needs of investors. More precisely, when
will a grievance concerning the efficacy of a particular corporation law be
brought to the court, as opposed to the legislature, for redress? In other
words, when is litigation cheaper than lobbying?
Ayres' hypothesis is that courts are more efficient law producers for
close, as opposed to public, corporations. A conjecture consistent with
this thesis is that it may be cheaper for participants in public corpora-
tions than for those in close corporations to lobby a legislature. Public-
firm issues may be more likely to recur, as their transactions are more
numerous than those of close corporations. These characteristics reduce
the cost of lobbying and create a demand for greater clarity that comes
from a general statute than from a judicial holding that can be limited to
the facts. Close corporation issues, however, may be more likely to arise
in an end-game setting when there are no gains to be had from the par-
ties' future relations. Hence, obtaining a "private personal ruling,"
which comes from a court, will be the cheaper course for these firms. In
addition, public firms may be better organized politically; they are likely
to have a major voice in the policy positions adopted by state chambers
of commerce and other business lobbying groups, and to have more inti-
mate relations with local politicians, as they are major local employers
and charitable contributors. What we need to know is, for varying cor-
porate contexts, the relative costs of informing courts and legislatures-
the costs of learning or updating information concerning what legal rules
are efficient for which types of firms-because the relative reaction speed
of courts and legislatures in providing relief presumably depends upon
information costs.
Another possibility is whether use of the corporate form changed over
the period from the enactment of general corporation statutes to the
burst of close corporation cases that Ayres discusses, which indicated the
need for specialized statutes. For instance, were there tax-code or part-
1992]
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nership-law changes that made parties in business shift to the corporate
form, thereby creating the statutory mismatch? Or- did these coincide
with technological innovations or other changes in business conditions?
The reforms of close corporation statutes appear to have occurred in the
same time period in which public corporation statutes were modernized
(the 1960s); is there a relation here indicating a renewed charter competi-
tion that touched all corporate levels, or is it simply coincidence?
These are the interesting questions, not whether Posner, Winter, and
Easterbrook have to battle it out on institutional efficiency, or, to put it in
a less flamboyant way, whether there is a strict dichotomy between
courts and legislatures as efficiency maximizers.
THE RELEVANCE OF STATE COMPETITION FOR CLOSE
CORPORATIONS
My second quibble concerns the close corporation context and the im-
port of state competition. One factor that Ayres does not mention, but
that supports his thesis regarding the absence of competition for close
corporation charters, is the lack of a capital market for close corporation
shares. Capital markets play a crucial function in ensuring that state
competition is efficient for public firms by mitigating the agency problem
that managers will seek laws that are detrimental to shareholders. The
thinness of the close corporation equity market is therefore another sig-
nal that state competition may not work well here. However, I am am-
bivalent as to whether Ayres has really overlooked something of note
that supports his thesis-hence this is just a quibble-because a thick
capital market is less relevant for the production of efficiency minded
close corporation codes, as there is little or no separation between owner-
ship and control in the close corporation.
The relevant question involves determining whether minority share-
holders are less well protected from majority shareholder exploitation
through disadvantageous corporation laws, as public corporation share-
holders are protected from self-interested managers, because their shares
are not marketable: that is, how much does state competition depend on
capital-market competition as opposed to low migration costs? To an-
swer this question, we would want to know whether minority sharehold-
ers pay too much for their initial investments-do they discount for the
posited imbalance in the legal regime? Presumably, the majority share-
holder in the close corporation wishes to obtain the maximum payment
for minority shares, and thus it will desire corporation codes (or share-
[Vol. 70:409
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holder voting agreements thereunder) that offer credible commitments
against exploitation. The minority shareholders of close corporations
may be better informed at the initial issuance of shares about the enter-
prise than the outside shareholders in public firms: they may be manag-
ers or close relatives of managers, or they may be venture capitalist firms,
quite well versed in the enterprises in which they invest.' There thus
may be alternative protections to a thick capital market for close corpo-
ration investors. In any event, how this affects competitive behavior for
charters should be explored.
Another, perhaps more important, factor is the likelihood of greater
diversity in ownership, management, and control arrangements across
close corporations than in publicly held firms. If this is the case, closely
held firms will be less likely to need and use standard form contracts,
which would make courts, rather than legislatures, the important govern-
ance institution for their investors. And it would downplay the need for,
as well as the possibility of, competition among states. That is, if there is
no useful default rule because a close corporation's problems are distinc-
tive, then there is no reason for states to compete by offering standard
form contracts, as such provisions will not reduce transaction costs. To
ascertain the validity of this claim, we need data comparing the variety
and uniformity of close corporation charters or voting arrangements.
The institution of significance for promoting efficient arrangements for
close corporations would be the courts, whose role is to enforce idiosyn-
cratic agreements, whether or not the states compete for close corpora-
tion charters. This view is consistent with Ayres' detailing of the role of
courts in close corporation law, but it provides an alternative gloss on the
significance of his claim regarding the absence of state competition in this
market sector.
While on the issue of corporation codes as standard form contracts, let
me make a tangential remark. If the law were so flexible concerning cor-
porate structure as to be completely trivial, as Bernard Black asserts-a
position with which Ayres seems to agree5 -- we would not need courts to
overturn inefficient statutes because corporation codes would not hinder
the parties from contracting as they wished. The efficient role of courts
in statutory updating that Ayres praises is superfluous if one buys Black's
4. See William A. Sahiman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations,
27 J. FIN. ECON. 473 (1990).
5. Ayres, supra note 1, at 375-76 (citing Bernard Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial? A Political
and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 542 (1990)).
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thesis, but not if one adopts the story I have offered: that courts and
legislatures are complementary institutions, that there will be a lag effect
in the efficacy of corporation laws, given the dynamic nature of the busi-
ness environment, and that there is less standardization in close corpora-
tion than in public corporation forms.
STRATEGIC INTERACTION OF COURTS AND LEGISLATURES
My third quibble relates to strategic considerations. If we consider the
structure of the game between courts and legislatures, the legislature has
the last move in the sequence. It therefore would be highly unusual for
us to find courts making inefficient decisions when they overturned close
corporation laws, because the courts must anticipate that such decisions
will be overruled by the legislature (if the legislature wishes to adopt effi-
cient rules). This view is consistent with Ayres' thesis, but the character-
ization that courts are willing to act primarily when the legislature is not
actively monitoring them, is, I think, inapposite and not necessary for his
thesis. Losing parties in the corporate context can notify the legislature
and turn it into a monitor, even if it had no interest in judicial monitoring
before the decision. This characterization is analogous to Mathew Mc-
Cubbins' and Thomas Schwartz's observation of Congress' fire-alarm ap-
proach to oversight of agencies: Congress exercises supervision over an
agency only after aggrieved constituents notify it of a problem. 6
In this regard, we should investigate how frequently after a court over-
turns a statute the legislature reverses itself and carefully codifies the
opinion (rather than engaging in continued benign supervisory neglect or
judicial reversal). Judicial modification of corporation laws to aid close
corporations need not be characterized as pursuit of the public good in
derogation of the legislature's will; instead, such a court can be viewed as
perfecting the legislature's will by acting, as the legislature would have
desired should the issue have been before it, to maximize shareholder
wealth. This more plausible characterization is consistent with all of the
examples Ayres provides.
I would be less persuaded of a dual-efficiency maximizing explanation
if Ayres could provide examples of the legislature's overruling court deci-
sions on close corporations because the state's public corporation busi-
ness was adversely affected or because interest groups objected. Ayres'
6. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police
Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCl. 165 (1984).
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example of the North Carolina statutory revision story of interest-group
politics is not clearly on point because it does not appear to follow a
judicial decision favoring the minority shareholders. It would be inter-
esting, however, to compare the lobbying strategies of the North Caro-
lina majority shareholders to those of public-corporation managers; did
they threaten employment losses or that local plants would be closed if
the minority position succeeded, as corporate managers typically contend
when lobbying for antitakeover statutes?' In the public-corporation con-
text, when these non-shareholder constituents are arguably affected, it is
more likely that a non-shareholder-value-maximizing corporation law is
produced.
There is also another player in the corporation code competition game
whose interests should be examined: the corporate bar. Ayres does note
the bar's role in the public-corporation context, and there is little reason
to think that attorneys are less important in the making of close corpora-
tion codes. Because corporate lawyers typically represent the firm, in the
close corporation context they may be likely to represent the majority
shareholders (the manager-owners). Examining the bar's activity is thus
one mechanism by which to operationalize and test Ayres' hypothesis
that legislatures are sympathetic to majority and not minority sharehold-
ers' interests in the choice of close corporation statutes.
Systematic empirical research into the making of close corporation
laws would be quite helpful on this point, as would tracing the evolution
of those laws across the states. If close corporation reforms spread as
quickly as innovations in public corporation codes, perhaps the world of
close corporation charters is more competitive than otherwise meets the
eye. The motive may not be to increase close corporation franchise fees.
Rather, it could be to maintain public-corporation fees. Namely, a legis-
lature might fear a negative reputational spillover effect on its public-
chartering business from its treatment of close corporations: if public
firms perceive that a state is not responsive to the concerns of close cor-
porations, they may conclude that it also will not be responsive to their
concerns.
I am skeptical, then, whether, as Ayres contends, states desire ineffi-
cient judicial holdings on close corporations to enhance their stock of
precedents for public corporations. Indeed, a stock of corporate-law
7. See Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REv. 111
(1987); Roberta Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and Public Opinion, 57 U.
CMs. L. REV. 457 (1988).
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precedents is of value primarily to Delaware in maintaining its competi-
tive position vis-a-vis other states, and it has so vast a number of public
firms that it does not need to misuse close corporation decisions to pro-
vide public-firm precedents.' A negative spillover effect would constrain
perverse incentives.
We might test which conjecture is correct by looking for changes in
trends of reincorporations and incorporations after judicial decisions,
which reform or do not reform statutes for close corporations, and after
the corresponding legislative reactions. Or we might see if there is a cor-
relation between states' responsiveness to close corporations' concerns
and their responsiveness to public corporations' concerns. We also might
want to know whether close corporation practices have changed as dra-
matically as public corporations; we might see less statutory action be-
cause business practices have not changed as rapidly; this also would be
true if private-firm arrangements are less standardized.
CONCLUSION
All of these points are quibbles that should not detract from the arti-
cle's valuable contribution. It highlights that the field of close corpora-
tions offers interesting insights into our understanding of the forces of
state competition and reminds us of the need to focus on the important
relation between courts and legislatures when evaluating this process.
8. See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985).
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